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Creating a "Should Cost" Culture Through Opportunity 
Management 
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including the F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter and the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). 
Riel also spent several years working as Senior Manager of Manufacturing and Continuous 
Improvement with one of our defense industry partners. [david.riel@dau.mil] 
Abstract 
The 2016 Performance of the Defense Acquisition System Annual Report states, “The 
institution of ‘should cost’ management … has been a success and should be a permanent 
feature of the DoD’s acquisition culture.” Yet, inculcation into culture implies a mindset that 
executes cost saving opportunities throughout all levels of the acquisition workforce to the 
lowest level workers. Initiatives, such as Configuration Steering Boards and USAF’s “Bending 
the Cost Curve” are important and communicate leadership engagement; however, creating a 
“should-cost” culture requires every level of the acquiring organization to continuously seek 
both small and large cost saving ideas. One could posit that the system engineering 
community has transformed from merely managing risks to expanding into exploring 
opportunities. However, the question becomes, are opportunities being as aggressively 
pursued and managed as risks? By conducting surveying, this research studies the 
perceptions of acquisition professionals as to the implementation of opportunity management 
for the purpose of determining the depth that “should-cost” philosophy has penetrated 
organizations. This study discusses methods to drive the “should-cost” philosophy deeper 
into organizations, along with the role that defense acquisition education could play. 
Introduction 
Although the concept of “should-cost” has been around since shortly after World War 
II as both technical and organizational complexity soared, the recent rendition of should-cost 
is traced to the Better Buying Power initiative, established by Ashton Carter, then Under 
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) in 2010 (Burt, 
1972; Husband, 2014). Recently, the Department of Defense (DoD) has touted to Congress 
that “lower contract costs, reduced cost overruns, and arrested cost growth” can be directly 
tied to BBP’s “should cost” initiative (Maucione, 2017). Accordingly, in the 2016 
Performance of the Defense Acquisition System Annual Report, the authors state that “the 
institution of ‘should cost’ management and its consistent emphasis over the last 6 years by 
the acquisition chain-of-command has been a success and should be a permanent feature 
of the DoD’s acquisition culture” (pp. xviii, xix). This statement is not surprising as Carter, in 
a 2011 Defense AT&L Magazine article, co-written by John Mueller, wrote that “There are 
no silver bullets; each PM must find solutions that fit his or her specific program. In the final 
analysis, embracing the ‘should cost’ management paradigm represents a cultural change, 
not just a one-time event” (p. 17), along with “It is not a one-time fix but a change in the 
culture of our government teams and our contractors” (Carter & Mueller, 2011, p. 18). Yet, 
inculcation into culture implies a mindset that executes cost saving opportunities throughout 
all levels of the acquisition workforce down to the lowest level workers. Yet, as Husband 
(2014) points out, “Unlike industry, which is driven by profits, government PMs often focus 
solely on risks and pay insufficient attention to cost-reduction opportunities” (p. 571). DoD 
Director of Defense Pricing, Shay Assad, said that instilling the acceptance of should-cost 
was a great struggle for the DoD and that the bureaucratic mindset, that is, culture, needed 
to start thinking differently from historical-based pricing, that is, “will cost” to “should-cost” 
(Maucione, 2017; Risor, 2011). Also, inculcation into culture implies that values and artifacts 
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align with the pursuit of should-cost, which takes time and leadership attention (Hatch & 
Cunliffe, 2013).  
For major programs, DoD 5000.02 requires that  
program managers, in consultation with the PEO, and the requirements 
sponsor, will, on at least an annual basis, identify and propose to the CSB 
(Configuration Steering Board) a set of recommended requirements changes 
to include descoping options that reduce program cost and/or moderate 
requirements and changes needed to respond to any threat developments. 
While the program managers’ efforts in bringing tradeoffs before the CSB is also a 
step in the right direction, reducing costly design decisions by capitalizing on the effects of 
many small changes will be difficult to achieve in a once yearly forum. For these types of 
tradeoffs, systematic, process-driven pursuit of small changes is required via other ways, for 
examlpe, opportunity management (OM).  
Similarly, in 2015, the Air Force announced its “Bending the Cost Curve” initiative, 
featuring a cost-capability analysis program, which also offers cost-savings opportunities. 
However, this initiative only promotes the conversation during the pre-EMD contract award 
stage. Unfortunately, it is only during detailed design that many cost-capability opportunities 
become apparent, reinforcing the need for a continuous opportunity-driven mindset. All of 
these initiatives are important and communicate leadership engagement; however, creating 
a “should-cost” culture requires acquisition professionals at all levels of the organization to 
continuously seek and implement both small and large cost saving ideas.  
With the replacement of the August 2006 Risk Management Guide for DoD 
Acquisition with the broadened June 2015, and subsequent 2017, Department of Defense 
Risk, Issue, and Opportunity Management Guide for Defense Acquisition Programs (ROI 
Guide; DoD, 2017), one could posit that the system engineering community has transformed 
from merely managing risks, both potential and realized (issues) to expanding into exploring 
opportunities. At the lower levels of the organization, opportunities, as defined by the ROI 
Guide, “are potential future benefits to the program’s cost, schedule, and/or performance 
baseline, usually achieved through proactive steps that include allocation of resources” (p. 
43), and that “risk and opportunity management support Better Buying Power initiatives to 
achieve should-cost objectives” (DoD, 2017, p. 43). Figure 1 from the RIO Guide highlights 
the relationship between should cost and OM, which elucidates the importance of OM at 
lower levels of an organization in the effort to create a “should-cost” culture. 
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Figure 1. Opportunities Help Deliver Should-Cost Objectives 
(DoD, 2017, Figure 4-1) 
However, the question becomes, are opportunities as well understood and are they 
being as aggressively pursued and managed as risk and issues? By conducting 
quantitatively-based, statistically-significant surveying, this research studied the perceptions 
of acquisition professionals as to the implementation of OM at the lower levels of acquisition 
organizations for the purpose of determining the depth that the “should-cost” philosophy via 
the lower level OM has penetrated their organizations. Using this data, the study posits 
methods for increasing the ability for leaders to drive “should-cost” philosophy deeper into 
their organizations and the role that defense acquisition education should play for the 
purpose of creating and sustaining a “should-cost” culture.  
Should Cost 
Although the concept of “should cost” is tied to the 1960s practice of employing a 
team of experts to complete a comprehensive, meticulous analysis at a defense industry 
contractor’s facility, and limited as “what a defense system ought to cost, assuming 
reasonable economy and efficiency in the contractor’s operations” (Burt, 1972, p. 3), Ashton 
Carter, in his BBP initiative, co-opted the phrase and broadened it to include challenging 
“the business-as-usual approach, with its underlying assumption that program costs will 
grow to match (or exceed) the independent cost estimate” (Carter & Mueller, 2011, p. 14). 
Carter and Mueller (2011) warn not to confuse the 2010 version of “should-cost” with the 
DFARS “should cost review” and its emphasis on production. The ultimate goal of the earlier 
should-cost review was to provide the government team with in-depth information in support 
of a better negotiating position and “set realistic objectives for negotiating the immediate 
contract” (Burt, 1972; Morin & Van Buren, 2011, p. 1). Instead, the “should-cost” initiative 
found in BBP demands across-the-lifecycle implementation, with a particular emphasis on 
“up-front planning and exploring engineering trades,” as program managers “drive leanness 
into their programs by establishing Should-Cost estimates at major milestone decisions,” by 
looking at every “cost element, including government costs, acquisition strategies, and any 
technique that could provide net savings” (Carter & Mueller, 2011, p. 16; Husband, 2014, p. 
568; Morin & Van Buren, 2011, p. 1). 
Congress, without using the term “should cost,” also addressed the use of historical 
data for budgeting purposes when the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011 passed employing the following verbiage: 
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(a) cost estimates developed for baseline descriptions and other program 
purposes … are not to be used for the purpose of contract negotiations or the 
obligation of funds; (b) cost analyses and targets developed for the purpose 
of contract negotiations and the obligation of funds are based on the 
government’s reasonable expectation of successful contract performance in 
accordance with the contractor’s proposal and previous experience. 
(Husband, 2014) 
Willen and Garber (2011) posit that when implemented systematically, should cost 
can “reduce system costs by 5 to 15 percent and subsystems by up to 40 percent.” In fact, 
William LaPlante, when Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ), 
claimed over $2 billion in actual program cost cutting in recent years with more to come 
(Serbu, 2015). Experience has shown that benefits are best when a cross-functional team, 
employing various skills, is required to reap the should-cost review benefits (Bioto et al., 
2012). 
Organizational Culture Change Challenges 
At its heart, “should cost” is about challenging the status quo, that is, the historical 
costs that form the basis of what a program is budgeted to. With the requirement of 
managing to should cost being a “long-term endeavor” (p. 17) and the inevitable resistance 
to change from the status quo, inculcation of should cost into the DoD culture will take 
considerable, persistent effort (Carter & Mueller, 2011, p. 14). Two major resistor elements 
are the DoD’s mechanistic organizational structure, which tends to preserve the status quo, 
and the program managers’ fear that “should cost” was just one more opportunity for higher 
headquarters to cut their funding (Husband, 2014). David Van Buren (Air Force Service 
Acquisition Executive) and Jamie Morin (Assistant Secretary of the Air Force [Financial 
Management and Comptroller]) in a joint memorandum confirm this trust issue by stating, 
“We recognize program managers have concerns about providing estimates that are lower 
than the budget, since DoD culture tends to use programming and budgeting to incentivize 
achievement”; however, they affirm that “this is not the intent of this [Should Cost] initiative” 
(Morin & Van Buren, 2011, p. 1.). Also, Carter sought to alleviate the fear of lost funding with 
his joint memorandum with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial 
Officer) Robert Hale, writing that after validation of actual savings by the Service Assistant 
Secretary (Financial Management and Comptroller), that “Savings would then generally be 
retained by the Service and reallocated to the highest priority needs as determined by the 
Service Secretary or a senior leader as designated by the Service Secretary” (Carter & Hale, 
2011, p. 1). 
The DoD’s mechanistic organizational structure may present an even more 
challenging hindrance to culture change. Mechanistic organizations are depicted by 
elevated levels of hierarchical structure and hegemony; distinctly delineated roles and 
responsibilities; written policies and practices; specialized, standardized tasks; and 
centralized decision-making procedures, which research has shown to be restrictive to the 
innovation, flexibility, and creativity needed to identify opportunities (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). 
Mechanistic organizations are intended to achieve certain goals using fixed regulations, 
policies, events, or standards, which can be difficult in a complex, changing world 
(“Mechanistic Organizations,” n.d.; Morgan, 1986). However, the advantages of a 
mechanistic organization are that formalization and control can lead to greater efficiencies 
through reduced variation and better predictability, which can help develop the institution of 
should-cost and OM, but will require added effort, as the mechanistic structure tends to hold 
fast to past practices, such as risk management (RM) only, rather than expand to include 
new practices, such as aggressively seeking OM (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; “Mechanistic 
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Organization,” n.d). Organizational structure induces and is interwoven with the culture, 
including a confirmed “negative correlation between centralization and innovation” 
(Whittinghill, 2011, p. 17). “Should cost,” and by extension OM, are a result of innovative 
behaviors and questioning status quo. For this to become cultural, strong leadership must 
encourage the creative thought needed to derive these opportunities.  
Schein’s Theory of Culture theorizes that a collection of basic assumptions, taken for 
granted by the culture’s member, form the basis of a culture (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). For 
example, in America, the freedom of speech and religion, along with our democratic 
elections, are basic cultural assumptions. Even as our mindfulness of these basic 
assumptions diminish, they guide our perceptions, thoughts, and feelings (Hatch & Cunliffe, 
2013). Schein considers values as the next level of culture, sharing that they provide the 
“social principles, goals, and standards that cultural members believe have intrinsic worth” 
(p. 169), leading members in their concept of right and wrong and leading to defined 
behavioral standards and expectations (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). The third and final level of 
Schein’s hypothesis is artifacts, which are the outward indicator of values in the form of 
objects, verbal expressions, and behaviors (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). The U.S. Marines 
phrase semper fidelis, Latin for “always faithful,” offers a superb case of an artifact derived 
from the values of honor and duty to country and fellow marines. 
While the inherent control that comes with a mechanistic organization makes 
expressing new ideas, questioning performance requirements, and change difficult, one 
potential way of increasing the likelihood of a shift towards a “should-cost” culture is by 
increasing the emphasis on a lower-level, grassroots approach to cost savings, OM 
(Morgan, 2006). 
Opportunity Management 
OM can be described as an extension of a disciplined system engineering approach, 
and complement to the more well-known and better implemented RM (DoD, 2017; Pridgen 
et al., 2012). In fact, risk and opportunities can be seen as opposite sides of the same coin 
(Dester & Blockley, 2003, p. 83). Opportunities are defined in the 2017 RIO Guide, as the 
“potential future benefits to the program’s cost, schedule, and/or performance baseline, 
usually achieved through reallocation of resources” (p. 43). OM is described by the RIO 
Guide as a support to “Better Buying Power initiatives to achieve should-cost objectives” 
(DoD, 2017, p. 43), as a way to “help offset cost or schedule impacts from realized risks” (p. 
43). The OM process is similar to the RM process with both employing a five-step approach. 
Figure 2, taken from the ROI Guide, describes the OM process. 
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Figure 2. Opportunity Management Process 
(DoD, 2017, Figure 4-2) 
Programs are advised that they may either use the RM board or establish a separate 
OM Board (OMB), and upon disposition, track the opportunity via an opportunity register, 
which is analogous to the risk register (DoD, 2017). The RIO Guide describes four possible 
dispositions after the opportunity candidate has been evaluated for potential cost, schedule, 
and performance benefits, along with any additional risks potentially introduced. Options 
included are the following: 
 “Pursue now – Fund and implement a plan to realize the opportunity. 
(Determination of whether to pursue the opportunity will include evaluation of 
the return of any investment when the opportunity would be realized, the cost, 
additional resources required, risk, and time to capture.) 
 Defer – Pursue/cut-in later; for example, request funds for the next budget 
and request the S&T community mature the concept. 
 Reevaluate – Continuously evaluate the opportunity for changes in 
circumstances. 
 Reject – Intentionally ignore an opportunity because of cost, technical 
readiness, resources, schedule burden, and/or low probability of successful 
capture” (DoD, 2017, p. 45) 
The RIO Guide advocates using any realized savings as an offset for any issues: yet, 
it also introduces the option to use the OM process to pursue more capability. While giving 
the warfighter added capabilities is a worthy goal, the better option may be to be more 
aggressive on “should-cost” goals. One of the potential problems with OM used for 
capability enhancement, as outlined by Conrow and Charette (2008) in their Defense AT&L 
Magazine article, “Opportunity Management: Be Careful What You Ask For,” is that “unless 
tightly controlled, OM may exacerbate the enduring problem of requirements creep that 
plagues programs today” (p. 16), defining opportunities as “the potentially desired better- (or 
greater-) than-expected outcome of an event or situation that requires an additional 
allocation or reallocation of resources to pursue” (p. 16). One could argue that this criticism, 
while somewhat valid, is narrowly-focused on one potential use of OM. Quite the opposite 
application could be pursued using OM methodology, where cost-driving performance 
requirements could be challenged with the opportunity to trade off certain thresholds if cost 
saving and/or avoidance amounts warranted, with consent of the budgeting command, who 
determine overall affordability in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, Operation 
of the Defense Acquisition System. In fact, the RIO Guide, while sharing the expectation that 
“high-return opportunities to improve the program life cycle cost, schedule and performance 
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baselines” (DoD, 2017, p. 47) be evaluated and actively pursued, expectations are also for 
programs to “establish opportunity likelihood and benefit criteria in line with program ‘should-
cost’ objectives” (p. 47). Analysis of the current DoD RIO Guide and defense acquisition 
education reveals the strong cultural preference for identifying and averting risks over 
identifying and pursuing opportunities. As described above, only five pages are dedicated to 
describing and instructing on OM within the 96-page RIO Guide. Also, an analysis of 
learning objectives of Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) curriculum demonstrates a strong preference for RM instruction 
over OM. 
Assessment of Defense Acquisition University Learning Objectives  
An analysis of the DAU curriculum focused on core DAWIA required courses for 
certification requirements revealed only one major terminal/enabling learning objective (ENG 
301) for the topic of OM related to should cost, compared to the 22 major terminal/enabling 
learning objectives on RM. (Note that ENG201: Applied Systems Engineering in Defense 
Acquisition, Part I, is under development, and course objectives were not available.) Figures 
3–16 show the results of a survey of DAU course objectives across the acquisition, 
engineering, contracting, and production, quality, and manufacturing learning objectives, 
where one might expect OM and RM objectives to most reasonably be found. 
 
Figure 3. ACQ 101—Fundamentals of Systems Acquisition Management Course 
Objectives 
 
Figure 4. ACQ 202—Intermediate Systems Acquisition, Part A Course Objectives 
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Figure 5. ACQ 203—Intermediate Systems Acquisition, Part B Course Objectives 
 
Figure 6. CON 360—Contracting for Decision Makers Course Objectives 
 
Figure 7. ENG 301—Leadership in Engineering Defense Systems Course 
Objectives 
 
Figure 8. ENG 101—Fundamentals of Systems Engineering Course Objectives 
 
Figure 9. ENG 202—Applied Systems Engineering in Defense Acquisition, Part II 
Course Objectives 
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Figure 10. ENG 301—Leadership in Engineering Defense Systems Course 
Objectives 
 
Figure 11. PMT 251—Program Management Tools, Part I Course Objectives 
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Figure 12. PMT 257—Program Management Tools, Part II Course Objectives 
 
Figure 13. PMT 352A—Program Management Office Course, Part A Course 
Objectives 
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Figure 14. PMT 352B—Program Management Office Course, Part B Course 
Objectives 
 
Figure 15. PQM 101—Production, Quality, and Manufacturing Fundamental Course 
Objectives 
 
Figure 16. PQM 301—Advance Production, Quality, and Manufacturing Course 
Objectives 
Not surprising with little emphasis placed both in policy and education, qualitative 
data from the Risk and Opportunity Management Survey confirm the perception that DoD 
acquisition professionals are more familiar with, and that organizations are more actively 
pursuing, RM over OM. 
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Quantitative Methodology 
A literature search has not revealed any qualitative or quantitative research on the 
acquisition workforce professionals’ perception of their understanding of RM and OM, or 
their leadership and organization’s pursuit of RM and OM. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The scientific aim of this research is to establish the need to increase the emphasis 
in education and practice of OM by comparing it to the emphasis on RM. While a 
comparison between RM and OM provides an evaluative tool for understanding any 
deficiencies in OM education and/or practice, the author is not advocating any decrease in 
RM at the expense of OM. Both are valuable tools in program management and cost 
control. The quantitative research questions directly applicable to the survey are as follows: 
1. Do acquisition workforce members perceive that they understand OM equal 
to RM? 
2. Do acquisition workforce members perceive that they work for leadership that 
encourages OM equal to RM? 
3. Do acquisition workforce members perceive that they work for an 
organization that actively pursues OM equal to RM? 
Answering these research questions through use of the survey instrument, focused 
on RM and OM, the former as a comparative tool, has the potential to provide the DoD with 
a practical roadmap to increase education in OM and make its practice a useful tool in the 
pursuit of a should-cost culture.  
Hypothesis 1: Acquisition workforce members perceive that they understand 
OM less than RM. 
The expectation is that acquisition workforce members will perceive that their 
understanding of OM is less than that of RM. Not only is OM less mature as a discipline, but 
the current DoD’s culture is more focused on ensuring that failure doesn’t occur than on 
creating opportunities for increased success. 
Hypothesis 2: Acquisition workforce members perceive that their leadership 
encourages OM less than RM. 
The expectation is that acquisition workforce members will perceive that, overall, 
their leadership encourages OM less so than RM. With the RM process being more 
ingrained in the system engineering process, leaders need to provide greater personal 
emphasis and expend greater personal energy on OM to create an environment where RM 
and OM receive equal attention and resources. 
Hypothesis 3: Acquisition workforce members perceive that their organization 
manages opportunities less than it manages risk. 
The expectation is that acquisition workforce members will perceive that their 
organization manages opportunities less than risk. Again, with RM process being more 
ingrained in system engineering process, organizations need to have processes that 
emphasize equal disciple and process control to RM and OM.  
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Research Design 
The most appropriate research design for exploring these hypotheses is to conduct 
surveys that can capture the perceptions of acquisition workforce members across multiple 
functional areas, years of experience, services, and organizational type. Questionnaires are 
an appropriate and relatively easy way to collect information across a wide population for 
studying behavioral items (Cozby & Bates, 2012). The research design consists of a simple, 
one-page questionnaire to be distributed via an email with an Opinio-developed 
questionnaire to previous DAU classes, as well as an identical paper version to be given in 
multiple DAU residential classes. It is developed specifically to minimize the time required to 
distribute and complete in order to encourage participation, since the paper version is being 
conducted using class time. Paper version surveys are post-collection converted 
electronically into the electronic Opinio format to reap the data collection analysis and 
reporting tools available through Opinio. 
Although preference would be to consider these hypotheses across the total 
population of interest—that is, all acquisition professionals, including all organizations, 
services, geographic areas, and experience levels—that would be too costly, impractical, 
and probably impossible (Acharya et al., 2013). Due to time and cost constraints, and a 
population of over 100,000 acquisition professionals (45,443 Army, 40,651 Navy, and 
25,075 Air Force, when surveyed in 2007), sampling was limited to students attending DAU 
courses at DAU Midwest campuses, that is, convenience sampling (DAU, 2007). One 
disadvantage of convenience sampling is that bias can be introduced since a sampling of 
DAU Midwest students will likely comprise a large percentage of students from the local 
USAF base, Wright-Patterson AFB, which may not be an accurate representation of the 
overall acquisition workforce population (Cozby & Bates, 2012). 
Population and Sample 
Questionnaires were made available to all acquisition workforce students taking 
classes at DAU Midwest campuses from mid-February through late-March 2017. With an 
acquisition workforce of over 100,000, a sample size of 384 participants is required to 
provide a precision of estimates of +5% with a 95% confidence level (Cozby & Bates, 2012). 
A total of 388 surveys were collected.  
Measures/Instrumentation 
A survey instrument (see Appendix) was developed specifically for this research. 
Perceptions on an understanding of, encouragement of, and use of OM was based specific 
questions on OM, as well as on a comparative analysis of participants’ perceptions of their 
understanding of, leadership encouragement of, and organizational use of RM.  
The survey is divided into two sections. The first section includes 10 statements 
employing a 5-point Likert scale used for each item (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly 
agree). The first six questions were directly related to the opportunity to RM comparison. 
The next three questions were created to qualitatively determine which specific areas of OM 
were perceptually most encouraged by leadership—continuous improvement in both generic 
and business processes and reductions in performance requirements. The last question was 
designed to understand if the acquisition workforce believed that they had specific ideas of 
where performance requirements could be traded off for financial savings.  
In order to better understand the acquisition workforce perceptions on opportunity 
culture, the following four demographic variable data were collected: branch of service, 
functional area, years employed in the acquisition workforce, and organizational type.  
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Data Collection Procedures 
An electronic link was sent to former students directing them to the survey site and 
ensuring that students understood that the survey was both anonymous and voluntary. Also, 
with the permission of instructors and consent of the students, the paper questionnaire was 
given to complete during class, again with the understanding that the survey was both 
anonymous and voluntary. Students who did not want to participate could either not open 
the survey, or if given a paper copy, not accept it or return it blank. Upon completion, 
students anonymously returned the surveys to a table at the front of the room. 
Data Analysis 
Due to time constraints for both collection and analysis of data, data analysis for 
each question was limited to between 383 to 388 responses. Also, to ensure that the 
research was not flawed by an alternative explanation, a succession of t-tests, using a 
significance level of .05, should be conducted to verify that the data does not vary 
significantly based on any of the demographic variables. For example, one could theorize 
that specific functional areas may vary in their perceptions and therefore may bias the data if 
a significant portion of those respondents were functionally aligned. 
The data collected did expose some significant trends in the perceptions of the 
current acquisition workforce, as the limited number of participants provides for an accuracy 
of approximately +5% given a 95% level of confidence.  
The first pair of questions analyzed were the participants’ perceived understandings 
of both RM and OM. Most notably, analysis of the results from “Question 1: I understand risk 
management” revealed that 89.2% of the participants either agreed or strongly agreed that 
they understood RM; whereas, that percentage dropped significantly to 55.9% for those 
participants that agreed or strongly agreed for the paired question on OM, “Question 4: I 
understand opportunity management.” Figures 17 and 18 provide the details on these two 
questions. 
 
Figure 17. Question 1 Results 
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Figure 18. Question 4 Results 
The second pair of analyzed questions were the participants’ perception of their 
leadership’s encouragement for them to identify risks and opportunities. Analysis of the 
results from “Question 2: I am encouraged by my leadership to identify risks” revealed that 
79.4% of the participants either agreed or strongly agreed that leadership encouraged them 
to identify risks; whereas, that percentage dropped significantly to 61.3% for those 
participants that agreed or strongly agreed for the paired question on OM, “Question 5: I am 
encouraged by my leadership to identify opportunities.” Figures 19 and 20 provide the 
details on these two questions. 
 
Figure 19. Question 2 Results 
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Figure 20. Question 5 Results 
The third pair of analyzed questions were the participants’ perception of whether or 
not their organization managed risks and opportunities. Analysis of the results from 
“Question 3: My organization manages risks” revealed that 71.3% of the participants either 
agreed or strongly agreed that their organization manages risks; whereas, that percentage 
dropped significantly to 45.1% for those participants that agreed or strongly agreed for the 
paired question on OM, “Question 6: My organization manages opportunities.” Figures 21 
and 22 provide the details on these two questions. 
 
Figure 21. Question 3 Results 
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Figure 22. Question 6 Results 
The fourth pair of analyzed questions were the participants’ perception of whether or 
not their leadership encouraged process improvement, to include questioning current 
business processes, in order to save money. Analysis of the results from “Question 7: I am 
encouraged by my leadership to continuously improve my current processes to save money” 
revealed that 65.2% of the participants either agreed or strongly agreed that their leadership 
encouraged their continuous process improvement. “Question 9: I am encouraged by my 
leadership to question current business process requirements when money can be saved” 
revealed similar results, with 56.2% of the respondents answering either “agreed” or 
“strongly agreed.” Figures 23 and 24 provide the details on these two questions. 
 
Figure 23. Question 7 Results 
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Figure 24. Question 9 Results 
The fifth pair of analyzed questions were the participants’ perception of whether or 
not their leadership encouraged them to question performance (i.e., users) requirements, 
and secondly, if they in fact could think of “at least one performance requirement” that could 
be traded in order to save money. Analysis of the results from “Question 8: I am encouraged 
by my leadership to question performance requirement when money can be saved” revealed 
similar results with the process improvement paired questions in that 57.7% of the 
participants either agreed or strongly agreed that their leadership encouraged questioning 
performance requirements. Question 10 strayed from the previous three questions in that it 
was ascertaining their opinion versus their perception of leadership. “Question 10: I can 
think of at least one performance requirement that we could trade-off to save our program 
money” indicated similar results, with 59.0% of the respondents answering either “agreed” or 
“strongly agreed.” Figures 25 and 26 provide the details on these two questions. 
 
Figure 25. Question 8 Results 
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Figure 26. Question 10 Results 
Demographics 
As expected due to the survey’s administration being primarily performed at the DAU 
Midwest’s Kettering, OH, campus in close proximity to Wright-Patterson AFB, nearly half 
(45.6%) of the respondents self-identified as “Air Force,” compared to only 1.3% self-
identifying as “Marine Corps” and 8.3% as “Navy.” In using these results for cultural inquiry, 
one could posit that this skew may affect the overall understanding of the general DoD 
population as each service may have its own distinct culture. Percent comparisons of 
individual questions within these groups were not conducted as the amount of data required 
for +5% accuracy given a 95% level of confidence diminishes the ability to provide definitive 
quantitative results for each demographic group. 
With the exception of the “Contracting/Financial Management” acquisition career 
field, a fairly even distribution of career fields were represented, with over half being either 
“Program Management” (25.8%) or “Engineering/Production, Quality and Manufacturing” 
(25.3%). Likewise, “years working in an acquisition career field” showed a reasonably even 
distribution. Of the four categories only “2–5 years” at 16% was relatively slightly 
represented. Finally, the organizational type that the respondents currently work in showed 
a relatively large percentage engaged in program offices at 40% with a relatively even 
distribution amongst the remaining four categories; albeit, “research laboratory” was only 
represented by 5.4% of the participant populations. Figures 27–30 contain detailed results of 
the four demographic questions 
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Figure 27. Question 11 Results 
 
Figure 28. Question 12 Results 
 
Figure 29. Question 13 Results 
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Figure 30. Question 14 Results 
Results  
All three hypotheses are supported. Respondents’ perceptions, as derived from 
Question 1 and Question 4, indicate a persistent gap in their own understanding of OM 
versus RM, which supports the notion and documentation presented earlier that there exists 
a lack of education on OM, especially when compared with RM, indicated by the wide 
disparity of 33.3% less respondents specifying that they understood OM (55.9%) compared 
to RM (89.2%). Also evident from the data (Question 2 and Question 4) is the respondents’ 
perception that their leadership encourages the pursuit of OM less so than RM, by a 
difference of 18.1% when comparing OM (61.3%) versus RM (79.4%). Finally, data indicates 
that respondents perceive organizations not managing opportunities as aggressively as 
risks, denoted by a difference of 26.2% when comparing OM (45.1%) and RM (71.3%). 
These results supporting the second and third hypotheses corroborate the notion that 
cultural inculcation of OM has yet to be achieved.  
Questions 7–10 reveal some important information regarding the respondents’ 
perceptions on two potential sources of opportunities for cost savings. While the majority of 
respondents signified that they either agreed or strongly agreed with leadership 
encouragement or their own ability to identify these opportunities, there is still work to be 
done if the DoD acquisition workforce, as a unified whole, adopts “should cost” through the 
grassroots efforts of OM, as large percentages of respondents either were neutral, 
disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the notion that their leadership encouraged general 
process improvement (34.0%), business process improvements (42.5%), or questioning 
performance requirements (41.5%). When questioned about their own ability to identify at 
least one requirement tradeable for savings, 39.9% selected neutral, disagreed, or strongly 
disagreed. 
The reminder of this paper will offer rationale and ideas in the development of 
increased education, leadership, and organization engagement and encouragement of OM 
through continuous process improvement and performance requirement tradeoffs, to foster 
an OM mindset furthering the potential to create a “should-cost” culture across the DoD. 
Increased Education on Opportunity Management to Foster “Should-Cost” 
Mentality 
The large gap between those participants who stated that they understood OM 
versus those who stated that they understood RM, couple with the demonstrated lack of 
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targeted curriculum on OM, as demonstrated by their absence from DAU’s DAWIA courses’ 
learning objectives, makes a strong case for an adjustment. If DoD leadership desires a 
culture that targets “should cost” versus “will cost,” the skills and emphasis should be 
developed for OM early within the education of our acquisition workforce. 
Currently, engineering (ENG), program management (PM), and production, quality, 
and manufacturing (PQM) functional areas have modules embedded in the residential 
courses dedicated to RM; however, none have been identified for OM. For example, the 
advanced PQM course, PQM301, has a module dedicated to Manufacturing Readiness 
Assessment and Risk Management; however, that module, and nowhere else in the course 
addresses OM. Both the intermediate (DAWIA Level II) and advanced (DAWIA Level III) 
courses for PM, PMT257, and PMT360, respectively, have RM as a major curriculum topic, 
but they make no mention of OM. Yet, DAU cannot unilaterally change the curriculum, 
because it must create and teach curriculum in agreement with the learning objectives 
established by the Functional Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) at the OSD. The Functional 
IPTs will need to direct DAU through the adjustment of learning objectives if OM will be 
taught to the acquisition workforce in order for the gap in understanding between what RM is 
versus what OM is to evaporate. 
As an interim step, DAU does have the ability to develop a continuous learning 
objective on OM. Currently, their catalog lists a CLM on RM, but none exists for OM. 
However, a search on the DAU website for “opportunity management” reveals an entry in 
Acquipedia and a “hot topic” recorded in June 2016 on Risk and Opportunity Management. 
Process Improvement 
Two survey questions, 7 and 9, were developed specifically to gauge the acquisition 
workforces’ perception of their leadership’s encouragement of their pursuit of process 
improvement, generally and specifically to business processes, which is considered a key 
for should-cost implementation. 
The role of “lean” in developing a “should-cost” culture was identified as 
implementation strategies by both USD(AT&L) Carter and the Air Force Service Acquisition 
Executive, David Van Buren. Shortly after the release of BBP 1.0, Carter and Mueller 
(2011), in their Defense AT&L Magazine article, Should Cost Management: Why? How?, 
assert that PMs should “call in the assistance of Lean Six Sigma experts to assess your 
processes and trim the fat. Encourage your contractors to similarly self-evaluate and jointly 
look at inefficiencies in processes you engage in together” (p. 18). Van Buren and the 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) Jamie Morin 
stated in their memorandum, Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management, 
that “program managers must begin to drive leanness into their programs by establishing 
Should-Cost estimates at major milestone decisions” (Morin & Van Buren, 2011). The two 
survey questions addressing process improvement, as previously reported, indicate that the 
majority of respondents felt that their leadership encouraged them to both “continuously 
improve [their] current processes to save money” (65.1%) and to “question current business 
process requirements when money can be saved” (56.2%). While this is encouraging, a 
nearer uniform attitude toward these pursuits would be highly beneficial. 
While specific implementation of lean is beyond the scope of this research, multiple 
gurus of lean philosophy have written of the importance of lean being inculcated into the 
culture rather than a program to follow. Jeffery Liker (2004), author of The Toyota Way, has 
indicated that “most attempts to implement lean have been fairly superficial. The reason is 
that most companies have focused too heavily on tools such as 5S and just-in-time, without 
understanding lean as an entire system that must permeate an organization’s culture.” 
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James Womack, credited with expanding the awareness of the power of lean via his co-
authored book with Daniel Jones and Daniel Roos, The Machine That Changed the World, 
states, “The big danger is that it becomes a ‘program’ that everyone is doing as a staff 
exercise but which no one understands and no one believes in. Then it is just another 
collection of tools without a context. It inevitably will fail” (Industry Week, 2005, p. 5). This 
paper’s author’s personal experience as senior manager of Continuous Improvement and 
Manufacturing while employed in the defense industry also attests to this, writing in his 
article, Lean Implementation: A Three-Pronged Attack, “it became apparent that if we were 
to successfully attain an attitude of continuous improvement—faster, better, cheaper, we 
needed to create a culture that would allow lean to thrive” (Riel, 2012, p. 35). 
Using OM as a disciplined tool to encourage critical thinking for program cost 
reduction presents an increased opportunity to drive culture change, provided it becomes 
more than a “staff exercise,” and instead is used to drive culture change.  
Performance Requirements Tradeoff Opportunities 
In 2015, the Air Force announced its “Bending the Cost Curve” initiative, introducing 
a cost-capability analysis program, which offers cost-savings opportunities. As William 
LaPlante, former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ), explains, 
“The warfighter can point us to the knee in the curve and say, ‘You know what? I’m not 
willing to pay more for this capability than that capability’” (Serbu, 2016, p. 2). LaPlante 
further explains that the Air Force “will match up the costs of each individual capability within 
a set of requirements and ask end users whether the mission benefit is worth the price” 
(Serbu, 2016, p. 2). However, the purpose for this discussion is pre-contract award, 
designed to “determine how the Air Force approaches its source selection” (p. 2). As 
LaPlante states, “Now we can put together a cost capability RFP that shows exactly where 
we’re willing to pay extra to get a capability” (Serbu, 2016, p. 2). While this initiative is very 
worthwhile and can surely allow the defense industry a better understanding of where the 
warfighter places priorities in dollar terms, it does not extend post-contract, when risks and 
opportunities become more evident as the detailed design progresses. 
The discussion on how much a certain requirement threshold is worth needs to 
extend beyond contract award. By offering a reliable way for a steady, long-term 
requirements review by the systems engineering community as the design progresses, the 
warfighters can be provided with a better understanding of optional short and long-term cost 
avoidance and/or savings prospects, that is, should cost that may become apparent as the 
design matures (Riel, 2017). Using OM methodology, a first step would be to outline the 
cost-avoidance/savings opportunity using robust “tradeoff–benefit” statements, employing 
practices from the RM section of the 2017 RIO Guide. Next, decide upon, track, and report 
on these opportunities as any other opportunity created in a more robust OM process than 
currently apparent in organizations.  
Although the RIO Guide presents opportunities as more geared towards investing 
financially today to improve future benefits, directing incremental requirements compromises 
today to lessen current risks and achieve future benefits is undoubtedly in the crux of the 
process, as the RIO Guide clarifies to “not ignore small improvements,” which when 
combined can prove critical to the cost avoidance and/or savings of the requirements 
tradeoff process (Riel, 2017). Using the models in the RIO Guide for registry development, 
requirement tradeoff opportunities (RTOs) can be documented and tracked using the same 
handling choices outlined in the RIO Guide—pursue now, defer, reevaluate, or reject. Also, 
employing a parallel procedure as found in the RIO Guide, a Requirement Tradeoff 
Opportunity Register could be created that designates the RTO; the likelihood of the 
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warfighter community reducing or eliminating the requirement; the negative impact on 
performance; and any positive impact on producibility, reliability, maintainability, and life-
cycle costs (Riel, 2017). This extension of the OM process is only possible if the OM 
process itself enjoys more consistent application as a tool for should cost. 
Using Opportunity Management to Drive Culture Change 
Although inculcating a should-cost culture may include practical aspects like better 
education and increased employee knowledge, skills, and motivation, successful 
transformation lies in the changes to its culture (Morgan, 2006). Culture change within the 
DoD can be difficult due to its hierarchical control and mechanistic structure. Yet, these 
challenges can be overcome with a shared, articulated vision via cultural values and 
artifacts that encourage the acquisition workforce to convert from a heavy RM bias to a more 
balanced RM/OM approach. Robust organizational cultures “generate an almost tangible 
social force field of energy that empowers employees” (Ojo, 2010, p. 4) and are associated 
with increased performance. While the basic assumptions’ layer of culture will not change as 
progress is sought from inherently risk-based to include as an equal opportunity-based, 
espoused values articulated through visible artifacts, including opportunity registers, 
signage, Opportunity Management Reviews, and so forth, will need to change for 
organization culture change to occur. The second layer of organizational culture, espoused 
values, provides the mission, goals, standards, and other measures designed to shape the 
organization’s strategies, decision-making, and leadership behaviors (Duke & Edet, 2012). 
Although DAU education will be important for the workforce to understand what OM is, the 
switch from predominately risk-based to an equal risk/opportunity-based model, requires 
leadership to ensure an added emphasis on OM as currently experienced by RM. 
Organizations tend towards stability as leaders intuitively seek to reduce risk through 
controls and structure, yet, at the “price of diminished innovation and zeal” (Jain, 2013, p. 
106), which will be required for OM and should cost to succeed. The addition of OM as an 
equal partner to RM and the driver for a “should-cost” mentality demands that “the shift goes 
all the way to [the] core of the culture” (Kofman & Senge, 1993, p. 17). However, Morgan 
(2006) elucidates that leaders who “understand the challenge of culture change recognize 
the enormity of [the] task” (p. 138). Culture is not something easily swayed, but rather needs 
to be cultivated over time. The importance and employment of OM will need to be 
championed repetitively through the use of artifacts. Formalization of new values coupled 
with consistency between words and actions can drive trust and create an atmosphere 
conducive to change (Michailova, 2000). Artifacts—such as posters, brochures, and 
published stories of OM successes—can add to the inculcation of OM to the DoD culture. 
Regarding the effects of organizational culture on change, Hatch and Cunliffe (2013) 
cite the research of Dan Denison, who “proposed that an organization’s strategy, culture and 
environment need to be aligned if an organization is to achieve high performance” (p. 186), 
judging that if culture affects behavior, then by managing the culture, preferred behaviors 
will develop. Leaders will need to incentivize the transition of the culture from one that 
emphasizes RM to one that allows system engineering’s attention to be shared with OM 
(Fairbanks, 2006). One key to instilling OM is to ensure that the progress and results from 
the established initiatives are tracked. Husband (2014) describes this process as potentially 
the “most important step,” stating that “without a tracking mechanism and a means to 
evaluate results, the efforts to create and develop plans for Should Cost initiatives are likely 
to be wasted” (p. 578), thus illustrating another reason for establishing such initiatives in an 
opportunity register. Willen and Garber (2011) advocate the use of a “detailed action plan 
with metrics that can gauged at specific milestones, starting with an aggressive 
implementation “mindset” to ensure that the SCR [Should Cost Review] is not viewed as 
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merely a study that when completed ends up on a shelf, unused,” and that “an aggressive 
attitude for challenging the status quo” is in place. That will take leadership.  
Leadership and the Creation of a “Should-Cost” Culture 
By using Ouchi’s concept of clan control, where new members are socialized into the 
culture and thus internalize the DoD’s values, principles, and purpose, the members of DoD 
leadership who control reward, recognition, and promotions can heavily influence the 
behavior and direction that the DoD adopts (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2013). However, an 
overemphasis on competition, where short-term results and looking good can trump 
performance over the long haul, can produce short-term results detrimental to long-term 
success of the weapon system (Kofman & Senge, 1993). Even beneficial long-term 
organizational goals must be coupled with ethical leadership, as creating hard, specific 
should-cost goals does not come without risks, as negative side effects can emerge. For 
example, reaching current acquisition phase, should-cost goals should not come at the 
expense of life cycle costs or required operational needs. Demanding goals can challenge 
ethical behavior, as narrow focus and ambition may cause program management teams to 
fixate on accomplishing specific should-cost goals without regard for greater DoD 
organizational goals and values. This is not to say that pride in accomplishing should-cost 
and OM goals is all bad; as Locke and Latham (2009) clarify, the possible drawbacks of 
goal-setting can be alleviated by managerial attention and solid, ethical leadership, citing 
that “organizations cannot thrive without being focused on their desired end results any 
more than an individual can thrive without goals to provide a sense of purpose” (p. 22). 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
As Husband (2014) points out, experienced acquisition officials will note that should 
cost and OM are not new; however, they will “require an abundance of strategic thinking and 
planning, and a long-term vision” (p. 589). In other words, developing a should-cost culture 
and employing some of the tools and opportunities described herein will require a 
leadership-centered approach. It will also need to engage the hearts and minds of the entire 
acquisition workforce, down to the grassroots level. Increased education in managing 
opportunities, to include requirement tradeoff opportunities, can and should play a role in the 
development of OM at the lowest levels of an organization, so that an overall “should-cost” 
culture can develop and endure. However, organizational change is difficult. Leaders 
wanting to produce a culture that gives equal precedence to OM as to RM face a formidable 
challenge and should recognize the work that it will take (Ivancevich et al., 2011; Morgan, 
2006).  
More complete quantitative research and longitudinal studies are recommended to 
understand whether the acquisition workforce trends towards an equitable assumption of 
OM and RM responsibilities over time as an indicator of culture shift success. Requirements 
should be challenged during the entire design process, using an RTO mentality, to ensure 
that they retain their value as the design matures. Leadership must create reward and 
recognition mechanisms consistent with reaping opportunities versus bias toward risk 
control to facilitate the shift towards a more balanced RM/OM resource allocation. Cultural 
markers, such as should-cost and OM success stories, need to become persistent artifacts 
to help change the culture. The 2016 Performance of the Defense Acquisition System 
Annual Report is correct in its statement that “the institution of ‘should cost’ management 
and its consistent emphasis over the last 6 years by the acquisition chain-of-command has 
been a success and should be a permanent feature of the DoD’s acquisition culture” (pp. 
xviii, xix). However, it will take a leadership-driven, persistent emphasis to change that 
culture. 
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